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Subject  Imrestnient promotion  and  protec~ion cla.Uses  in agreements  ·~e;t-: 
ween  the Community  and  various  ca·begories  of developing country  : 
achievements to date  ~d guidelines for joint action  · ,  ··  · · · 
·  .. 
Introduction· 
~  ~  ' : 
In_  Januai-y  1~;!78 the ·commission presented a  communic~t:i.on t.o tho  Coun~ii· ; ... 
~~  ~-~. 
setting out  the  guid<~lines for  Community  action to encourage  Ehropea.i>:  invest.;..· 
.,.- ...  ·  ';•'" .... 
ment  in  t~0 developing countries  • 
. .  .;: 
Since then the Community  has  had to take-decisions -on  the inoll.tsionof invest:"'" 
ment  clauses  in cooperation agreements. to be ·oonoiuded with various  develo~  . 
.  .  .  .  .  .-- .  .  ·,· 
ping countries  or  g:ti.O~ps ·of  d~veloping cquxrtries~  Negotiations  on _this  ·-"· 
.  .  H i1  .  ·  .  ·  .  .  :  /  .  - ·:  - -.  - .·  .  . ·. ·. ·_::·.:  ~  ·:  .· 
matter  hB.:ve  been successfully completed with the ACP  States1  ABEAN  Member. ·coun.;. 
.  .  - .  .  .  .  . . 
tries,  Yugoslavia and  Brazil~  :•and  takeri"to. t~e staJte·. of a  dr-~.ft:~~:;,:;rit'i~ in: 
the ·framework of "tlie_-Eur~!Jab  ~ciialogue .;.further  .~eg6ti~ti~na,:·ticit'~i7/.'_:··'-'- ... 
\  ·'  '  .·  . .  .  ·.  \  .  .  , .... 
with. Iridia and the. Andean  P~o-t  countries,.  ·-w.~: due_ .to  _begin-·_Bh()rtly~-- ~--~~:;~-= 
.  -:- .  .·  ~- ..  ···; 
·.:! 
.. 
This  would therefore seem to be  a  suitable  mo~erit to revi,ew progl-ees to 
date in this field  and  set  out  guidelines for joint -~tfon to be u.nderta- .  '  ~  .  .  -·  .  .  .  .  . -
ken  as regards both the implementation of the  .pr~visions  'n~got·i·a~ed. s6  c 
:  ....  -- ,.  :.  .  -·· 
far and the developing countri,es-with which negotiations are .being- or a.re  .  .  .  . ..  .  ..  .  ·: 
shortly to be held. 
Such is the aim of this --r-eport~-------'-
.. 
. .  -·  .  -·  ':·..) 
:_._  i.  -·· 
It is not,  therefore,  concerned with the Comrriun.ity  position to b~ adopted 
in international discussions  on  the subject -~f  for.~ign investment •. That·· 
matter has been dealt with inter alia in  a.  Commission  working paper.  :i.n 
colinoction with the preparations for UN!DO  IIIo 
·-'l-I. Achievements  t·o dfl.te 
The 1978  Commission pr~osals covered two types  of arrangement 
~ t?-e  negotia·bo~ oF agreements  (or  clause~ to be  inc6rpora:i;~ in. ooopera.-
. t1on ~a.,r::-reemeats)  with developing countries  or groups  of developing ooun...: 
.•.  '·  ... 
trie.st -regarding the basic rules for the treatment  of foreign invest-
. ;nta 
measures to be applied  on  a  case-by:-case ~asia (in  particul~ the conclu-
. sj  .. ;on  of'  specific  a.gre~menta backed up  ~Ihere appropriate by Community finan-
cial gv.arantees)  for the selei::tive promotio11  of investment .Pl'Ojects  of 
special  interest both to the Comnn.mity  and the host  country. 
/" 
:~~  the negotiations  \<.ihi¢:\:~ha.ve taken place· s.o far with various developing. 
countries,  progress  hG.s  been ·m~e on various  ideas put  forlia.rd by  ~he Co~ 
mission  :i.n.  the fieiCi.  of legd· protection  fo1~. inveatllie..TJ.ts,  but' :the  examilia.- · 
•  .  i" 
t:i.on  of  a  finan~:i.e.l  guat~:ktee (or 'backup for action by:  the Member  States), 
.  ' 
which constitutes an internal Community  in<?.trwnent,  has still. p:rodu?ed no.· 
positive results.  •· 
•  ..  •,>,) 
•"' 
.. ,  .. 
.. - .. , .. 
efforts :ha-re  so far focused  on ,the more  general 
theme,,  namely baai.c  rule!:::  for  inveetment~  Following an  agreement  between 
the trTO  sides  Oll  -the principles which shOuld govern  a  oonve~tion in ill:i.s  .  .  .  v· 
f~-?1d,  the Europea.,.""J.  members  of  tha working  c~mmit·tee con1Jerned.. have drawn 
mutual  promotion  and :prote,otion of.':< 
inve<:rtrnents~  Thi.S do0u;·1ent.  :jJa  a.  f"..Uly. worked-up  and detn.iled legal  t~., 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
.  .  . 
·v.p  a  draft  Eur~,N'a.b Conv'-l:crtion  on 
which stands  a  good  chan<~ta  of being  appi~oved without  au.b1.1tantial  t-.in~d.-· . 
.  ,  ·- ' 
meJttr;  when the  suspended d:..dlogue  is resumedo. 
The  l>JOT'k  don(:i  in this cont'3rl  clearly revealed  a.  consE':.USUS  1rli thin the  :· 
Ooumr.:.nHy  on.  tb.EJ  c:l~ta:i.led  C.Ol\t•:mto  of  an  ::i.nveatment  protec+::i:on  accord .to. 
.  .  '  .  . 
be St'l.lnn:i:t-ted. to a  specific group  o:f  developing co1.mtries  ..  · Admitterll~ ·in 
ti~ c.;:.ae  in.  point  &u* q.  consens·us  ~'las  ,made  easier by the f'act  that  aeve-
l'al  cf  ~the il.l"'ab  oou:ntries likewis.e had  au  obvious  interest" in :reach.i.r!g  tm 
agr·3emea.t  ikhioh would  px-ot 00t their  ow.:u  inveatmants  :i.:.u  Europe.  :But  the 
- 3-specific nature of these Arab  inves·~merits  (mainly finanol.al.· ass~ts) posed 
'  '  . 
particular p:r:-oblems  for the El.J.ropean ·aide whiob.  is more  iuae'd.  to  dis~uesing  .. 
'·· 
the treatment  of direct  investmeni;s  ;  this was  the oaae  no·~  ably. 'Wi t;h:  regard 
.  . 
to the non-discriminatory treatment  o:f por;tfoli'o investments  and the trans-
fer  of investments  and  income.·  Moreover it was  neoes~ary at the outset-to 
convince our Arab  partne.rs not to insist  on.  th~ coverage  of .monetary r:i,ak 
(against  inflation and  ex~hange rate fluctua.t_ions)  and to find  a  respons-e. 
t~ the Arab  olaim to be· allowed to derogate. f~om  applyin~ :nat'ional ..  eat~ 
ment  on  the grounds  of development  policy.  ~-----"~ · ·--- ---, · ·,_,, ..  -~ 
0  ·~~N  •  0  o  - ....  - __  ...._  --~- ~ ~- 0 ---·- ~ 
--- - -~-- ···.·--;.· ...  :.-:-
_.·  -.- ·-·  -·~---. ~  ----····.··.---·,.:. .. 7':  .. 
_:·.; 
:- ::  ~~- .. --.-··-·  - ·--·-·- -·· -· .....  '·· 
._·,· 
..  ,  ~-
.:~  '~- ~ 
2. Eegotiati  :ms  for the renewal  of the Lome  Cf:>nventio:2':  The  Community :Pro.posed 
·to the ACP  States that the new  agreement  should c_ontain ·oertain  cla.1,1s~s 
'aimed  at the  promot~o~ ii.nd ·}Jroteotion  of  investme.nta  in generAl,  pluS  ,;~·.··  '-
more. specific provisions  covering ·specific  ~vestments in  .. the-,m~ing  .~d  ·_··· . 
. energy sectors  of particular 'interest to both. pmiea.  , ·  ..  ~.:~.- . 
.  '  ....  ..  ·-;..· ...... 
:·,·.· 
.  ·  ......  ,J  •• 
a)  On  the .treatment· of investments. in  gene1~al,  t~e 6ommun'ity,  ·because of  the 
. difffeul  ties  ~resented by aqeements  on  basi~ investment: nues  ~-d.  a ·t.ime 
schedule ruling out. lengthy negoti-ations  on  ~u:oh rules,  ~-ha.cl~ simply\~~.{  _,  · 
forw~""<i a  f~rmUla inter alia aff:Lr~ing t~e  ,import~oe  'in ·the ·mci:hla.l;·irit~­
rest  of concluding reciprocal  investmerrt. pr~motio:h all,d .protection agre8- · 
merits •.  This  proposal  had to be droppecl  in the ·f-inal stages of  the  negQ...:~~· 
•  '  •  •  •  '  J  '  •  ,·'  .. :··..  ':/ 
tiations owing to rigid opposition·from.a handful  of ACP  States fearing 
.  ··'  .  .  .  .  .- -:-·  '  ' 
'that in the circumstances  accession to the new.Convention would· morally-/ 
-ob~ige them to' sign such  ~eements•  The propos~d.  formul~:  11as  rep~_aced­
by a_muoh  more  general declaration of intent "to t.a.ke  suoh  steps  a.s.!'oUld. 
promote  investment"  in fields  of mutual  interest.  · \,  '•  ..•. 
• ..  ·;,. 
The  Community  proposal for  non-discrimiria.tio~ b-s·twaen  in~eatments f;o'm  the 
,  vario~a Member  States,  on  the  othe.r  ~a.-·1q 7  was··  ad.o:r;rf::-ed.  a:n_d  spelled  o~t in . 
a  joint declaration annexed to the final  aot  of tie Lome  Con~/ention  ..  ·The 
·ai:>piic-atTon-b'r· tlii8ril?;ht  ... ia·l>-ased.~ii-·1iifa:fera.r i.nf~giwernii1Emt&i:,.agr-e-e:· 
·menta--·~ala:Hng~to--tno:  __ t_rea1anmit--~of-·rriv-e;t-mC-.:ita-·w-:a:iol\--sliair- ~iive~u!-ot~ 
renoe  agreements. 
- t+-. For the purp()se  __ 9:f  applying non~iEI_crimina,t  ory:. trea:tme.nt  ~  the  ..  ~cntra.c-.. 
ting _sta.t.es  _oon.cserttttl  O:r.e  to oonolude  a.gl.eemex~,ts. ~..n  ·thtil  fol'm of  Q%on~n.-
. -- ·-- - ,•·  ·-;··-·- ... 
gea  __ Cl_:f' _l_E)tter.s .  or some _()t_h_er.  ~ppr_op~ia.t.?  ... form. ···----:....- -···--.  ~  ------~: ..  ~----- ..  ----- --· ------.  -~-:--:  __________________________ --
-----.------------ _ .. _____  ---------~--- ----------------- --- - ----·- ------- ·-- .  ----.--- -- -~- .  .., .. --· --·· .. ··--·-------------,···  . _______________ ,._  -------- ____________ ;. ____  ----------
.  , ______ :  ____________ ~ __  :.__  ________ :_ __________________________  _'_:_ ________  .  __ .. ____ -- ----
.  . 
th~ declaration specifies that  such agreelilE>.nts .will cover disputes. relating 
to investment .only where they arise after the  entr-.r into force  of 'the new. 
Convention  ;  but  invest1pents  made  before ·that date which he;ve  not  gi;,..en  .. · 
rise to any dispute  m~~also qualify for ,,;on-discrimi:na~o:cy trea:tm~nt, 
since it is stated that their treatment  sha.ll 'be ·examined. oy·lihe. parties 
cono9rned,~ case by ease,  in the iight  of ·l.:he  prov~sions of the_ a.g:t.eement 
~--.: 
.'  ,:·--: 
. - .  ' - .  . 
..  .  _)' 
Th•:>  no~1-d:i.scrimi.n.ation clause is wi-thout  precedent  in. the fieJ.d  of the legal 
i 
prote<rtio:n  of  inves"tmen~d~  and  in' principle :h  should be  equi.,ralent  ill effect 
to ·c,:he  Gcmruunity  agreements  on paaic rl>.les  ~r•posed by ·i:lte  .Cor.andssi~n  i.~~  ',  . 
.  .  ',  "'  .  .  .; 
put  firrn.s  from all "Mem"ber  StaJ;es  on  e.n  eq'J.al  footing as  regards treatment 
Of'  +.heir assets ·in the  de·v~lopilJ.g -COlL"ltries  CO:llOerned,.  .It. remains  ~0 be ' -'  . 
seen to what;  e:11..-tent  this  obJectiv-e  oan be  ~ttained. in  relation_s with the  . 
ACP  States by  maa.ns  of the b:.iJ.ateral ,·a,greeinents  ~ro\~!led for 'iil ·the .deol~ ." 
ration"  ··"- -·-- ...  ::  ...  .  .. -· 
J:n  a;::y  event,  the decla-ration has not  settled the problem of trealim.ent  of  · ·· 
invee"tm~m·ts in ACP  States which i1a.ve  not  concluded investment  agreement,a 
' .... -··-' 
a.nd  d.o  not  intend to do  so  ..  .. 
·-··:--';"· 
b)  Regar~i.ng the promotion  of  mi:t~ing ancl oe::rgy · investme!1ts  in ·.A.CP  countries;. 
:-. 
bo:th  Bidea  reco&'lized ·t;h.e  impox·tance  ot:  .apecifio protective meaeures_ as  a. 
means of encouraging European f:i.rma  ·l;o  aagT'.ge ilL this  ~ector and thus brin.g  ·:. 
into. pla:J  t;h.e  incr~ase! opportuni  t:i.es  opened up :by  ·the new  (:;o.u~e:tlti"Ol-""'1  for  '.  . 
SoP  and.  ftli8  part~cipa·ti-:m,  wl\~.Ch 3h01."1.ld.  eRseutially pJ.c.\Y  t.he role Of  Oa:t~. 
lysts "ior  i:nvestJJle:nt. 
- 5-·-rhat  iG. tb.e purpose. of the  join-t -ACP-EEC  d~claration cmnexed to the ne:si  -· 
· Conva:nti;n  c.t  the request  t?f  the ACP  Sta.t(g!e  which p:!:"ovideliil  for the  pos~i­
bilit;y- of concluding- agreements between  the~ACP States  on· the  one  hand  anCl.  ·. 
'  '  .  '  .-- .  .  .  .  .  .:·  ' 
the Community  and its Member States  on  the other;  rela.ti~~g to speoj.f'io  .·  · 
..;.  __  :~ ·~ ..  -· .  __  ~- -·  ·. 
;ninL?J.g  and  ene:-gy sector projects promo·l;ed  b;y  the concerned AGP  Stata,where"the 
Communityrecognizef' that  such proje()ts  are of interest to  it and EurO-
pean capital is involved in  t~~ financing~ 
Thus  the. negotiations with the ACP  States showed  thos~ countries·  t,~  be~ 
U:.":;>l'illing  to bind themselves  in any wey they feel  is in?ompatible with " 
national sovereignty,  for  ex~ple by  o~nQedii?.g any  aut6m~t'ic.  or ..r~troa.ct:iva, 
foroe to the extension of .rights  grant~d: to  a.  thirdp~ty, ,but  not  o~po~ed .· 
in  p~ill::;:i.ple  b  discussing matters  of.  investmentc  . The  re£~r~cs to ·~pec·i-
fic agreements  in  tlie~mining and  energy sector wa.s  never  .~al.led  in~o qUes- ' 
tion in the  neg~t-iations.  Similarly,  a  nUJ:nber· of  ACP  States 't'trere :notably .·  . 
. open-minded regardi:qg  th~ conclusion  of a.greements-in the investment field 
-·as indicatt?d for thl3tance  i~-the speech by the  :Pr~siden(of the Council 
.  .  - .  '  i•• 
of ACP  Minist  erl3  at. the signing of  Lome  II  -.provided their. SO'rereignty  ' ' 
. is sa.feguardedo 
:·._  ..... 
The negotiations  on  the. investment' clause. included in the Cooperation:·A.gree.:.. 
ment  rec~ntly sign~d  .w~t~ the five  m~mber countrj,.es· of.  ASEAN  (In~od~~f~, ·.  -:., 
. Malaysia.,  Philipp.ine~,  singapore,  'I
1haYland)  were  h~lp~_bY:. th~ open .4~titude. 
'  -· 
of these countries  tow~ds foreign  investment  whi'ch they consid-er neoessaioy_ .·· 
to develop  and diversify their  industri~ c~paoity and  b~ild u~~ theif'tech~~ 
nological potential  •. 
·_ .. , 
.-.. 
·Evidence of this can be seen .in the promotion measures. taken by :thesE(cou:n2 ·_ 
'tries themselves  and the relatively high number  of promotion  and protection  · . 
~eements 
7 
concluded with Member  States  of 'th~  Community9  . In. the .investment .. · 
·"  .· 
clause of the Agreement,  which is based  on. the text  ~opted ·an  this  ~attar 
at the 1978  Comnru.nity-ASEAN  ministerial  meeting, .it is laid down  that~ in 
.  . 
·_order to improve. the already favourable  investment. climate,  the parties should 
·encournge  ef'forts to extend the agreements  on  investment  pr.omotioh 'and pro-'  ..  . 
te~tior..,  .while  ensuring that these agreements· endeavour to apply the principle 
,,:  . of non-discriminatio;•,  aim at providing fair and  equitable treatment  and 
.  . 
reflect the principle  o~ :o.·eoiprooity.  The  Council stated that _the  ~ee-
ments  prov_ided .for in the clause are to be concluded by the Member  States 
of the Community- and.  -~he  lltGH}ber  countries  of  ASEAJIL, 
What  is involved;  therefore,  is· a  declaration of  intiDt by the member  coun-
. _tries  of both groupings to add to the network of bilateral agreements 
.  .  .  .  . 
this being aimed  ~ore especially at those Member  States which have concluded 
very few,  1f any,  agreements  of this kind so far.  Among  the thra_e principles 
to be followed  in concluding new  agreements,  the _reoj;procity  and"  fair and  ..  ·  . 
.  . 
equitable treatment criteria are standar-d ·for  ~;Juch agreements. 
.  ..  . '• 
'-,•'  ,,'· 
.  '· 
The non.:..ciiscrimination principle,  on the  other hand,  is based· on  ·t;he  Lome  II 
fo;rrm.lla  and  means that  any n.ew  agreements  concluded in the EEC-ASEAN  context  .  .  .  ~  . 
should.  riot  deviate too fa:r  from  existing  agreem~ts; so as  to·  ~void  .discri"!'"··:< 
.  ' 
· mina·i;ion between investors from different  c~tries  ... 
_,.·,. 
...  .., 
However,  unlike the joint declaration in ·th,e. Lome  Convention)  the formula 
adopted in the_  coopera-tion- agreement  with the ASEAN  countries does not· 
. establish a  right to non-discriminatory treatment. 
. .  .  .  . 
In any event,  :t;he  existence in the EE9-ASE.!l..N  oont~xt of  a  considerable num-
ber of agreements  of differing scope oonolu.ded by certain Member  States would 
have "made  strict application of the principle of  non~iscrimiriation extremely 
complex  and haphazard. 
·,,,· 
I.: 
4•  Tha  investment  clause in the  ~centl;~ --concluded  ~eement between. Yugoal~~i~­
and the Comnnmity leys  d.ow:n  that the  Cantraot
1 illg-Partie~ should--t-ake," steps  ~~,~0 
to proin.ote  and.protect  each  other's  investments  and  in this regard  endeav()~~,·: 
. to conclude reciprocal  inyestment  promotion' and. protection  ag~_eemen·ta to their 
....... -·-- ..  ····· <···-·::··-,····-. ·-·---.....  '---.- '!  .:  .•  ·--;----'·  --····--·- .:::."'.-~-------- ...... 
-mutual· advantage  ..  . -.... 
.  . ------ -·-· -- .. ------------ .... - .. 
This formula  -~eor~sents something .of  e  oormnitment  by the  parti~; t~  -- .  .  . 
~  - .  ·.  :  '  . 
.  ·,  .  .  '  - . 
establish contractual  links  in the sphere  ~~,investment incentives,  rfithout 
actually specifying the nature or content  of the agreements to be concluded 
in thia·areao Gommuni ty o.ontains  an  investment  clause  o1·. general  caraoter,  according 
to wl_lich  the Contracting parties  intend to· facilitate _and  promote,  by· 
.  . 
·appropriat!".mea,Bures,  favoUrable  conditions foT the expansion  of  invest..;·-
ment&,  o.n  ~v-~t~eoiA$ b~~- £~~ Baoh. of 'llh  ....  int-~rasted-p-~i~s.- .·.- ... 
.  7~'·  .,.  -.·  ~·  '..  '  . . :.:.·-.  :  ·--·  ·":'  :  .,- ·;..:..  ~:,_~-,~·  .. ~.: -· 
..  ---~--:-:·----:-:  .--~-- ____  -;,,, .. ,.  . . ·~·-···  .  --.  ··;_.·.-·.- ---·-···  ··· ..  .  .  .  ·-:~  -- -·-.:  ~--····  ~---·-·  . --··· ·-· ---
..  '•,  ,____  ------ ----- ------·-····----------- ·---· 
This  opening clause, • although not ·involving any  pre~ise'. undertaking,  will 
- .. -----. --
make  it possible for 'the 'parties,  to. cons'ider concrete mea.eures  iD.. order 
to attain·  ~he aim laid down  in the· clailse.  . -. 
,.  --,:·x  -- .· 
'x  .x 
_______ :.....:...• 
'  .  ·lq. 
;  i._ 
The ·results- obtained hitherto with incentives  fo~ European  investment  in 
·the developing countries reflect the dive,rsity ·or the positions ·or the. 
.  .  .  .  ,,  '  .  .  •'  . 
'  ~ ;• :..  ·. 
variou"S  negotiating partners,  the variety of prior arrangementS' for foreign  '_:_ 
•  \  •  .  •  '! 
investment  and the Community's  own  different. interests.  •· 
:  ~~-- ' 
~  ~- :~ 
t'hey represent the( acguis  communautaire in _this  sphere  and_:m~ consequ.e;t.tly 
·have some  value as  a  precedent for current. or _future  n.egotiatio~s with.  other-
developing countries'.  "'  v {\ 
'  ... 
_._..  ",.,!'  ,  ... 
'i,  -· 
The precedent lies first and  fo~e~os{ in  -~the  v~cy fact  of ,having. included 
in a  cooperation  agreeni~t  ·between tp.e  Cormmmity  arid.non_:member  .oouhtri~s 
clauses  aimed  at protecting,  and thereby promoting,  f~rei~ inv~stment of 
"  ,  .  'I,  .  ,  .  . 
. mutual benefit to the hos.t  country and the  ;'Co~:i.ty.  Such  arrange-ments' 
are also an, integral part  of industrial cooperation between  th~ ·c~~i~y. 
:and the.  developing-countries  conce~ed bec~e  ~hey d~ not  stem from  a  ::: 
. concession ··requested by the Community in retUrn. for  ~a.d.ous ,bener_its  b~-{ 
from'  ·a  clear grasp of where  mutual  interests lie.- ·r·.·.:  ..  ·  ~~·:·.  :·  ..  •· 
'• 
This  is obviously particularly applicable: to developing  countrie~ which  c~ 
hope to benefit from the reciprocity built into these clauses ·or' wish to · 
·keep· the option to use it open.;  , .  - ·· .. 
i  ' 
'  I  • ~  ·:.-· 
With regard to the oontent  of investment  ~'J:.auses,  the formulas· adopted up to 
. - .  "  - .,  '  ~  .  -
now,  i.e. a  formal:  agreement  on  the basic: ~es,· the clause on  non-d~_scr.i~:... 
natory  treatmen~ between Member  States,. specific agreements for, individual 
projects  and the clauSe opening the w~  :folj  subsequent  measures will :provide. 
a  very useful basis for f'uture negotiations. 
-s-Ilo  Guidelines for future  Commm1ity  action to encourage  investment  in the 
. developin.c::;  countries 
Guidelines  for the aoE]J.cation  of the investment  clauses in agi:eements ·  · ' 
concluded by the Community 
Unlike the Euro-Arab  convention  on  the promotion  and protection of invest-·. 
ment,  which,  when  signed and  in force, .will in itself constitu·te an  immedia;_ 
\ 
tely applicable commitment  under international law,  the investment  claus.es 
in the  other_ agreements  concluded. by the Community set  out  principies and 
intentions which the Contracting Parties will have to give concrete shape. 
later.  . ' .  ~- -: '  -: 
'· 
The  Community's  action here could be based  on the following guidelines 
1~ In the context  of the new  Lome  Convention 
.  . 
:  ~ ..... 
..  '· 
- With regard to ~he non-discriminatorY'  t~eatmerit provided for in the joint· 
declaration relating .to b-ticle 64  of the. 96nvention;" it is ·up to the ·con.:.· 
•  •  '  <  '  I  •.  -
t~acting States - ~d in particular the Community  Member  States' concerned -
·.to make  such treatment  applicable by recplesting the  ho~t AqP  country the. 
conclusion  of an  agreement  relating to the ·treatment  of investmellts which  .  .  .  .  . 
would be based  on  bilateral investment. ~reatie13,. known  as ·"reference 
agreements"  (l)o 
As  regards  such.  reference agreements  concluded befor.e the entry into ,force. 
· of the  Convention,  the application of  non~iscriminatory treatment shall 
'·-~. -. :·j 
··take into account  a:ny  previsions in. the 'reference agreement  ;  the  ooncern~d 
,.ACP  State has  however the right to ·modify or adapt  this  treat~ent when.  ~:.:_ .. 
ternatio~al obligations and/or changed de  f~oto oircumstan~~s· so ·n.eoess~tate.  .  -- .  . 
The parties concerned theri  agree  on  th~ form of  thei~ agreement  o 
... 
.  It would be advisable for the Member  States to discuss· within the Council,.: 
how  they intend to use the right to the n'on-disoriminatory treatment' of>  .: 
investment.  At  a  later stage it might  prove  ~eful to have. a  notifiqation 
.. procedure which would enable the  Memb~~ States to be  informed  as  a  matter 
·of course of' any new bilateral agreements  and.  "extension agreements"  con-
eluded".  .· 
(1)  In this respect,  the list or reference agreements  inoffioially submitted . 
·- ·.  during the Lome  negooiations should serve as a basis  and brought.  up to date 
periodically• 'In .the case an  ACP  State has  concluded several bilateral 
agreements,  the parties concerned shall choose the one tbat will -serve as 
"referenoe S&reement-". 
_q  ... - In accordan,ce withArtiole 63  of the Convention,  which points out  the. need 
t~ take euoh steps.  as  would  promote  investment,  and  in ord.0r to· iolva. tho· 
problem  ·~f the treatment  of investment  operations  in ACP  States ·which have· 
.  .  . 
not  concluded bilateral  investment  agreements  and which are therefore not·' .. 
bound by the declaration. on  non~isorimination, the CoiiilllUliity  anci· its- Mein- •· 
. ber States should  explore the poss.ibill.ty of concluding with one  or more  of 
those ACP  States ~which wish ·s-9-i~~;st~~t~~;~~;;:t~~  ~h-ich-~~~~id-hei~~~~:~'"-i 
•  .  •  tl  •  .  • • • :··--~  -·-·  ------
enoouraie.~he- .inflow ·or. lliropean  ~ capit~~-;-~~~-~~e.. ~1.-~~  ·_s:~~-~~~ng)iiEt~:-~~---. 
~:~o~er.eignty of the host country• . 
. ' 
.  _';: 
···:·  ·  . 
., .  .'  ~  '  . .::: 
:;-
..;. .Lastly,  th_e  Community  and its Member  Sta.i;es  should  endeavOur,  .in conjunction 
with th~ host countries concerned  and· on  their  initiativ~, to ·pro~ote ~rc>-
- .  :-- ,·  .  ,.  .  .  ,·  .  .·  -- . 
pean investment  in _mining  and· ene;rgy development  projects in ·the ACP  States· 
j;o which both 'sided :attach particnilar  importan~e  •.  :rn·  order to do this,:· 
they should m,ake  uae of ~he increased  opportm1itie~ :for  a<)~ion b;-~h~-EDF 
, and the EIB  in this: sec_,.tor  opened up by t·he·  Convention,  and  also- conclude ·  · 
with the  AC~ .Statesjj ~oncerned agreements  oil  specific projects  P~:-~ina.Il.cea. 
••• ··: 1  ;  •  -._ -·:· 
by European capital.  ·'  . 
"  '·  .  ~ 
:- ...  /  .·_ 
·-.  >  :~  . ·.' . ---· 
.. 
: ... :  ~-:  .\·.;~,:~: -~-~---·:  ~-- ' ... 
.. 
~opean undertakings wouldhave a  greater.inoentive to invest if the  CoDliil'li.:. 
nity and the Member  State~ could offer them,  in addition to  the preven~iv~>:: 
protection COilfiJtituied· py t.he specific  ~e~ment· signed by  _th~ publ~o' auth~ 
.  .  ..  '  .  '  ~- -- .  . 
. rities,  a  financial  guarantee aga.iD.st  n!)n..;oom.merciai  ~risks,  in oases where  ':.; 
such  guar~tees.  o~ld not be  provide~ by  __ na~fonal ~arantee bodie~ (~).  ):t~.~-~? 
.. -.  .  ":·  ..  ~  :.  ..  >}_.··~{:·:··  ..  ~j<  ~- ~:_··~ 
.. ·:.  '•  ·:··,·' 
The  Commission  proposes that this que.stioribe d.ealt  withduring·th.e  .. ~.t~al  ,_· 
.  .  .  '  .•  . 
examination  of a  specific agreement,- on  the basis of the proposals-'  1~- has  .. ,.· _ 
.  already Iliade ·in this respect  ( 2).  ,  ,  ·:  , <  ,·  ,  ./,  ·  ,,:  ·.: 
''•  . 
.  --~  .  '· .  . 
. (1)  The  import'ance  of having a  multilater~ guarantee system for c.avering the 
par~icularly high risks in this sector is brought  out by such moves  as  the 
Inter-Ameri9an Development  Bank's recent  proposal to create afacility of 
·its oWn  along these lines in .order to  encour~~ mining and  energy invest-
ment  operations  in Latin America:.  In this respect,  it is striking that most 
~~;-"'-Of-iol:!a ·Member  -States-of··the--ComrnWli~;y---have ·had--a favourable  or. at ·least in-
:terestcd-first. reaction,- -when  the proposa1·\va.S··tabled. 
(2)  see cor,r,(7S)  23  final ~f-.30 January 1978- pp.'  9-11 
·  and  COM( 79)  130 final  of 14 Maroh  1979  - pp.  11-13 
--10-2.  In the context  of the Agreement  with the member  countries  of ASEAN 
--------~-----------------~------ .  ..  ,  ... 
Relatively speaking,  the largest number  of  investment  promotion and protec-
tion agreements  have been 6onclud_ed by the Member_States with the member 
countries  of ASEAN.  Among  other things,  this  e:x:piains  the. s~lution speci-
fically adopted in the Cooperation  Agreem~t, namely bilateral· ext.ension of 
the network~ 
The  Member  States will therefore have to address themselves to this 'task ; 
. they will,  of course,  start from very different_ points,  ooncern.i!lg' t~-~-1:1~-
ber of bilateral agreements  concluded.  ~~-~:-~------ -'=~-·=~- _____ . .  · 
'  ..  -~-- . 
:· .. :  ..  . 
. ·rt has  already be~ mentioned in connection with the principles to be f()llowed 
i;n negotiating ne>(  agreements that reciprocity and fair and  eq\iitable treat.:. 
.  .  .  .  '  .•  .  .  .  ..  ·  - .. 
ment  should not cause  an.y  problem,  while the principle of non-discrimination 
should be conceived sufficiently fl.exibly.,  1;hus  generally  ~aking.  for  ~-degree 
~  .  .  .  '·.  . 
of protection 'which is no less than that  a.J.rea.dy  afforded by ·exiSt~· _agreements.· 
-~ .. 
,  ;j. 
·····-- -- --------~ -- ·---····------------·  - ---;-···-···---'· -- -------------------~- ..  --------------- --·-·· -- -----~--
__ ,Moreov_er,  it would seem to be in  __ the _oontraoting  .. -pal1;ie~ 'interest. riot' _to  _____ ~_:.;-
-;~~t;;i~t-tb.~ir~ ~o_t_i,;it-i.~a~.-~--th~-~;-~st~~~t-;fi~id-.t~-~~-~d~-~:~~h~ network_or 
bilateral agreements. 
.  .  . 
Industrial  and technical  cooperatipn,  with par~icular emphaSis' oll  mining. 
operations - which. the Agreement  recommends  should be  encouraged - o'ould ·  ·- ,..  . 
·  be facilitated,  as  in the oase of the ACP  States, . by the conclusion  of.>-~ 
.  .  .  ..  .  ..  '  .... 
agreements  ·on  specific projects between the Community  and the Member  S~atest 
.; .. 
on  the one hand,  and the member.  countries of ASEAN,  on  the other. 
- In addition, .the Community  should  join with its ASEAN  partners in seeking 
to develop  contacts  and promotional aoti'rities between the two regions  •_ 
firms  arid  organizations,  particularly to pave the wa:y- for new  European  -> ·. 
_-:investment  o:L•  the acquisition  ofholdin~; in S~th East.  AJ;;ia.~  Such--ao~.i­
vities,  which got  off to a  promising start with the two conferences  on 
industrial  coo~eration,  might be given  e  more  institutional form,  still to 
be. determined. 3.  In the context  of the Agreement  with Yugoslavia_  .- --- ----- ~ ---- ~- ~--- ~-- --
The•fact that Yugoslavia has  agreed to include a  .clause on  promotion .and .. 
protection of foreign  investment  in its Agr~eme~t:  .. with the Community might.· 
be underat.ood to mean  that it is  open to  thi~- type1 of  infl~~'  _pro~ided that 
.  .  . 
.  cer.tain conditions are satisf'ied and  account  is taken -of. the·.  speoifi~ fea.;;, .. 
tures  of its economic  system under which,  f_oz:  instance,  no foreign f'irm 
·m~ have  a  majority shareholding.  .',;' 
.  '·:  ~  . 
·- .. ·. 
. In  additio~,  Yugoslavia has  concluded  investment  promotion  and protecti_on 
...__;" 
agreements with two Member  States. 
..  :·-=. 
As  soon-as the agreement  enters .int9 force,  the Community  shou~d therefore-~ 
propose  implementing ~l?.e  investment  clause and  exploring with th~ other ..  '._ .. 
"  ~-··  -.- . .  .  . '  '  .  .  .  .  " 
/ 
Contracting Party what  content  and form the .reciprocal  investment  agr~ements.  .  .  ~  '  .  .  .  ' 
provided f'or  in _this  claus.e might  be given. 
~. 
. i1  r: 
· . 
·::·  ·.·:. 
As  regards the basic rules for the treatment  of investment, .:the _most  effective 
solution - _since it av;ids the necessity 'or. negotiat-ing a:.set ·of agreements·· · 
presupposed by such  solution~ as  the  extensi~n: of bilateral  .agree~ent~ 0;  ·,_ .. ;  .. 
.  .  . .  . , 
non-discriminatory treatment  ...:  would be  an  agreement  be~we~l'l the Member. States 
·as  a  whole  and Yugoslavia,. 
'· 
.  i,"  ·.  ,, 
.. · •. 
\.The relationship between  a  multilateral.  agre~~ent. of this  ·:kind  ~d bilateral 
agreements might  be dealt with,  as  in the draft EurO-Arab  convention,  by'  '  .. 
appropriate clauses _safeguarding the interests  of the .Member Stat·e~  whil~ : . 
· offering undertakings  maximum  protection. 
.  ... 
-;'  .. 
·.' 
The parties-could also  explore the possibility of'  concluding agreements  on 
.  the  eno~uragement of investment  in  a_ number  of sectors  persuant' to the  '  ·' 
Agreement,  which ma.ices  particular p~ovision r  .:Jr  the :participation of  c(>mmu.;.:· 
·nity {mdertaki::!.gs  in resear<:>h,  production  ~d  p~ooessing programrit~s  in· oon~· 
nection with Yugoslavia's  energy resources  ••  r: 
- ~~-4.  In the context  of the Agreement  with Brazil 
--~-------------------
Brazil continues' to be  one  of the ml:l,in  focuses  of European  investment· · 
flows to the developing countries  in generS.l  and. South  Americ~.": in par-
ticular. 
The  investment  conditions  and climate in Brazil are generally regarded as 
stable and  satis£actory both by undertakings  and by the Governments  of the 
Member  St.,;_tes,  which regularly agree to provide .cover for  investment  pro-
jects against· non-comme-rcial. risks,. despite the: fact. that the o.o;mtry has . 
.  ::"  .,  '  '  .  .  -
never signed any international  investment protection agreement. 
This satisfactory state of affairs.  c"ould be further improved if, Brazil 
decided to abandon granting favourable  investment  conditions  en a  uni-· · 
\  '  .  .  '  . 
lateral basis in favour' o£  international.· cooperation in this field.  , _., 
In  order to  implement the future developments clause in the agteemen:t 
with Brazil,  specific agreements for individual projects might prove 
.  .  .  .  .  - ,. .. ' :!  '  ..  ';  . 
a  partioular.ly appropriate instrument  as it might  logically to be 
'' '  . 
perce1ved by Brazil as  a  means  of safeguarding its  sov~reignty more. 
effectively  •.. Such agreements  might  turn  out to be a  more 'pragmatic  .  .. 
solution than agreements  on  the basic· rules.  ~ :···,  :  •..  . 
.:.- · .. ,:.· 
·,  ·· .. 
In view of the type and scale of the investment  projects to be ~dertake 
in Brazil,  especially for developing its mineral resources  and energy 
.  .  '  .·  .  ~  .  ' 
potential,  specific agreements  might  help to step up the involvement  of· 
Community undertakings  in the .country,  thus ,-serving the interests of 
both parties. B.  Guidelines for ·future-negotiations 
Those developing countries_with ~hioh  .. the Community  ~a ;i)r-~p~irfg~~~ 
:Jl~gotiate' cooperation  Sir'e(!l~en_ts,  nam_ely  __ :i~e-·And~e.~1)_~~ ..  <?~l_.Ultr~-~~--­
-:~d_I~dia,· d.i~p~-~ :the  __ -_same  ·:r_elu<?~~-0.~-j~- i~ourjnt~rg~~~~m~t~:L"":  ..  ~ 
- .. - . ·- ·- ·-· ·- ~ ... 
iegai  commitments  to--promote--and-protect  foreign_inves_tm~i.~:Yei~~{ 
~he_  -~~e t~~~e  t~e;-~e  ~;n~eies·t~  __ iil.  :t~e_j~~~-~f~s~oh~_irifXo!rs-~=-~ · 
.  ·-·.  ·· .. ·. 
The  establishment  of closer relations  ·bet~een these 'c_ountries  and the Commu- · 
nity might  therefore be conducive-to exPloring new  forms  of coope'ration in  _ 
. this-field, taking account  o£. the  differ~t w~s in which the  h~st -~~tri.e~  -.  • 
'  .  .  .  .  ~:  .  -·  '  .  .  ' 
view  ~he role of foreign investment  in their development  processes  • 
.  ·  ..  ·' 
;,  .: 
in this  <?onnection,··'the various cooperation  ~eeziamt~- shoUld-comprise ·gen~_-
ral opening clauses specifying the' aims  of ;investment  cooperation -'as envi-' 
saged in _the _agreein¥r. wi_th_-Br.a2i~l~:~-~~~--~~~~~t:~e_~-P:a.r.~~-es~~-~-I"~=~~-=-~·~,~·;:~·::~:i~~ --_:··; 
can consider at  a  later stage what  pract~cal steps should be  taken_~-o-attain-
these aims.  .  - .._ .. ··:  .. · . 
. . . ~- --.-· 
,- ..  ·. :· 
With this in mind,  the Community_  might·  base its ~att~tude taw~s the -differen~ 
deve~opizlg countries  on  the. considerations set  ~forth- below.·> 
··'.  .·· 
The  Andean  Group  .: ,;· ~  •' 
:.  =:.:·  ·.·.  ··:····('.·  -.  :  ..  -.. 
_(  __ ·_: 
The, encouragement  of investment  should be  on~-inajor- aim of' the .c~operation 
agreement  whioh the Community is about·  t~ oonolude wlth .the :five._memb~~-_'  ~-.>.-._. 
•  •  'I'  •  ·- •  •  •  •  •  •  :. •  •  •  '. 
countries  of the And_ean  Group,  set up  in 1969 by the Cartagena' Agree~~,t~(l). 
·,:. 
~ '  ;. . .  .. 
Despite the relative importance of the  An~~-an Group .among  t_he  developing  '-
. countries - it is the :tourth largest  exporter and  importer,. the seventh la;.. . 
. gest producer and  one  of the main  supplie~s of raw  material~ ...;.  ~o-pe~  .. 
investment  in these countries  is low:  in 1977 net.direot  priv~t~ tnvest-
. ment  by the  M~mber States was·  only  ~- 36  m~llion ( oo~p~ed with p l54. ~illio~ 
by the United States)  and  has never  exceeded 8 %  ot total  investment  in 
'·  .... 
Latin America. 
. .  ~  . 
(1)_ Initially this agreement  was  signed by ~olivia, .Chile, -colombia,  Ecuador  . 
and Peru  ;  Venezuela aooeded to it in 1973  and Chile oeased to be a  mem- · 
·  _:ber  in  1976  · '·  . 
.  -If+·~-The European undertakings  have not  been reassured by the  And~an countries' 
stated position on foreign  investment,  oausing them to share the opposi-. 
tion of the other Latin American countries to international  commitments 
on  this point  (1). and,  in particular,  to  e~tablish in 1971,  under their 
Decision n°. 24,  subsequently amended  by other decisions,  a  common  set· of 
rules for the treatment  of foreign capital requiring ail members  of the 
Group  to incorporate a·number  of substantive  ~d procedural provisions 
. into their national legislation,  thou~h leaving them some  latitude in 
determining their national policies in thiEL connection. 
·.  The  most  important  of these provisions  ~onoe~ the  -~B.dual -con~ersion 'or·; 
the foreign firm into a  ''joint" undertaking (with national  investors 
exercising effective control  and holding at least 51 %  ot the shares), 
· res.trictions  on the transfer of capital  ~d  e~ings, l~ss ·favourable-
treatment than that'accorded to national firms (  e_sp~oially in -~esp43ct. 
of credit facilities and trade within the Andean  Group)  and detiuled 
rules  on'  the transfer of technoiogy.  '/: 
,,  !'.  . .. 
The  existence of this legisl·ation should not,: however,  preven~ the Conlmu.-' 
nity from  exploring possible forms  of investment  cooperation With the  . --
.Andean  Group.  . The. Group  would seem to be tak;i.ng a_ rl;Lther  more  open atti-
tude to foreign investment,  as is borne  out,  f'or.instance,  by its.positive 
'  .  .  •.  . . 
response to the Inter-American Development .Bank's proposal to set up  a 
mul tilatera.J. guarantee fUnd  to encourage ;inv~st'~ent .in the· nll.ning  mi.d 
'energy sectors in Latin America,  despite the; faot  that this wOuld  mean 
-.. 
relinquishing some  degree of sovereignty..  .  ..  .  ·,· ..  ·  .:  ,_; .... 
"'\. :•: 
.  . :.· 
p.) 
. ''. 
: .;  ~ !  • '  ·.I  '  .  • 
The  only exception has been the "conventional"  investment  protection. 
and promotion ·agreement  concluded in 1965:between' Ecuador and  Gar~;. 
though this agreement.' is still formally in force, 'it obviously. no 
longer r.eflects Ecuador's position and thus  would not be a  suitable 
"reference agreement"  for other Member  Si'ates.  ·  · 
- 1'5_- .. Moreover,  the Community,  which has  an interest in enoouragipg the pro-
cess  of integration begun within the Andean  Group  would  appear to. be· 
better placed than  others to discuss w~  of increasing the flow of 
'  investment under conditions satisfactory for both parties•  Faced with· 
the common  attitude of the Andean  countries  on this question,  the Commu-
nity for its part  must  establish a  joint': position.  . ~ .. ,.  •.  - . ·. 
.  .  ~- . 
The. Community  could accordingly put forward the. idea of 1 ·an· 
.  :  agreemen~:  t 0. covex-. ~nv~_~tment_s  '_\'ll:l~ch.  \.1ol4~~embiaoi.-_a.li~.  ~1?--~ 2'  ~  :..  ~~~=~--=~=~ 
member  countries  of the two regions  and  would take· due account,  inter 
.!!J.!,  of the intrinsic features  of the Andean  oo~on system.  .·  ~·:  .. 
.  .  .  .  . .  . 
Since the Andean  countries are anxious to devel.op  ~ th~ir large ·mineral_ and· 
agreements for individual projects. 
·,.·  -...  ; 
·-.  ... ! 
--·- .. --, 
. India  j 
· ..  ·  .... 
~:rn-dia- c:;e>:naid.~rs··-that-ili; rncii;n·a·Olis-fitutiont-c:>getliarw:it}l-tli~7~~:-~_~:-:,::-
--..  ..  .  ..  .  .  - -_.  - .  .  .  - -- ····:  ·--:····  ··;:······--.---- -·  ·------___;.. ___ .:., __ ._;.-;-__,:  ___ -:.:· 
country's rules  and regulations give ali.  seo~rity to roreign firms  engaged 
in business activity open to foreign  :i,nvestment. ·  ·  ' j'  .  ,  . ,  ... ·- .  '-:-; 
··-
·  ... 
•'  '  .  ·.  -~- . 
._._·.  ·-- !  -'!. -·.  - .,  .. ' .. ••'  .• 
_In  1964 India  o.onclud~d ~  investment protection: ·agreement -with the FederaJ 
Republic· of Germany  incorporating the  ess~ti8l  · basiQ rules  ~pplioabie in. · 
.  .  '- (,  ;•' ..  _;. 
.  =·-·  .  ~' '  . 
.  j.'  ·,_  this field. 
,;,,. .·  . -.•  ~  .. 
:! :. 
:  .. .  · 
~ ... 
·'·: 
However,  this is a  pr-ovisional  a8reement  between governments  which was  not 
ratified by the parliaments  concerned  ( ocmtrary to practice in the case of 
~1 other German  agreements),  and ita va.iue as  a  preciedent:!s--~:~.::._.:"_  .. :  ___  ~~ 
therefore limited.  India,  moreover,  appears to be: opposed to the terms  of 
this agreement  being applied to all the Member_ States  and  unwill_in~  ···t'o 
agr·ee to  even  a  mention of the subject  of investment treatment in the 
·coopez:-ation  agreement.  .  ..  .: 
-
The  Community,  however,  should propose that this ·import~t aspect_ of.economio 
cooperation between the two parties be  inc~udEd in the  ~eement,  ~at least· in 
!·  .  .  .  . 
the form  of a  clause on  improving the  olim~~e of investuiE!nt,  ~j,hich Would  open·-·. 
.  i  :  .  .  -
_the  w~  for subsequent  consideration of appropriate oonorete measures. 
- IG-: c.  Possible negotiations with other developing countries 
Southern Mediterranean countries 
. ···-. ·-· ·-"-·------ -~----~- -----·-- -- ··--·- ···-· 
.Ali the .Arab  countries with whioh_  the Coniiin.iliity  ~as  conclud~d·o.;,e~all  co~. 
peration  .. agreements ·within the  c~mt  ext. of)  ts: -"Mediterranean  ~a.ppr()ach1.1  . ~~uld 
·be covered by the Euro-:Arab. Convent16n ·on  ":Investment  Promot£on and.  ~ot-~c-
.  ti~~. ,.Approval  of .the:  Conventi~~  ..  will._'b(:)_.:~e .·~i\he  ~p_rior~t-; ite~--~f.~r :_.-:, 
.discussion when  the Euro-.l).rab  Dialogu~_  ~~ resumed.  . . 
'.·.  ·;,. 
·Hence,  only if the Convention were not  approved. or the Euro-Arab agreement . 
assumed  a  much  more  general  character than planned at present,  wotlld the ... · 
Community have to take i_:t;he  initiative of  present~rig its. investment propO- ·  ., 
sals through the Cooperation Cotincils,  whose  job it  is·  to monitor the 
.•. 
working of the Mediterranean agreements .and propose further cooperation 
measures. 
.  . ~  .... ;· 
A similar proposal  on  investment cooperation should in cucy:  case be submitted 
~ to Israel. 
The  Gulf States 
'  .  ~ .  ·.  ~ 
. .  ~  . 
•'  ·~  •  •, •  A 
.·  ... 
. . ·' . _;  .  .  ...... ;,.; . 
..  "<·  -·, 
..  ·.  - ~:. 
The  Gulf States would also be covered by the Eu.rcr-Arab  Convention.  ._Should .the 
Community  engage in negotiations with them with a view to conol}lding bilat~rai 
agreements,  those a€"r.eements  should eith.er illolude a  r~f~rence to the_ Conven-· 
tion or,  in 4efault of the Convention,  provide clauses baSed  on the resUlt . 
actually achieved in the Ellro-Arab Dialogue. 
< .;·  ·-.  '/-;  •' 
--~ 
. Other countries 
Among  the other non-member  countries with which the  Co~ity  could discuss 
the question of investment,  particular attention should be given to ClU.nao 
·China has  recently altered its position regaroing the- role which f.oreign inves-
.  . 
ment. is canplay in the country's development.  It is important therefore to  :  .. 
·ensure  that  Community  firms  are able to participate in. China's  develOpment  · _l:  ... 
·  ..  ·:efforts under  th~ beut  poaaible oonditions. 
- 1'7-Conclusion 
. Consideration of the Community's  achievements  in promoting EUropean 
investment  in the  ~eveioping cotl:ntries  and of  po~_sible future action. 
in this sphere,  reveals  the diversity of the situations _in ,quest-ion 
and  of the positions  of the parties involved and,  ·consequ~tly;·  ·the 
difficulty·  of producing formulas  which w~ld be universally applicable,. 
···-·-
For this reason it has proved necessary ...;  and' will doubtless be ne9essary  · 
/  '  .  .  .  .  . 
in the future - to have recourse to different variants. of the two basic 
~struments p~cpcsed by the Cpmmission,  namely  agreemen~s  -c~ the  __ basic 
rules for investment  and specific agreemen,ts  fer· individual·  projects.-~:~, 
·.  - .......... 
. ' 
.  ··- - -...  . --
.  - .  .  , ...  :._  ..  . . .  ~ .  -. .  ' 
FUrthermore,  c_ertain guidelines  emerge from the Community's. action  •·  ·,'." 
in this  sphere~ nota'bl3' :  '  .  , _  .,_..  .  ·  ·· · ··· ·  ·. 
'  _,.  '  !  . .. :. .  ,_._;  . -·  :~  . 
:'- .·  .  ,.·  ,..  .  ..:.  .  .  " 
.  -:•.  ·-.: ..  ·  1 
- the utility of raising ~he subject  of· inve,s_tment  with ,all partner  ··, 
developing  countri,si~  including those rel'p.ctant to agree to cooperati'on 
in. this field  ; ·  - · 
.. >  -~:,::  .. 
~ .  . ' 
- the desirability of incorporating the b~.~~ rules on  invest~ent -~r  ?~her·· 
. meaSures  in an  agreement distinct from the overall ooop:eJ;'ation  agr~'ement~ 
•,  !>  I  •  '  '  '- •  •• 
· .  ~-~:~~i!:S-!~!~c-;oper~~1~ri-~~~:e~~t  --?on_t.¥~~;~,  ~-~~~~~-~P~~g-~::~~~~~~~::f-~~  ·: 
. .  .  ~-
--'the potential  importance  of the  inst~erit'  comprising specl.fic  .  ·  .  .  .  .  '  .  .  .  ... 
..  ·'·  . 
agreements for individual projects, ·  pr~erably.  supplemented by_  .  . 
.  •  .  .  ;  ;  . •  ~  .  . .  . :  I  . .  '{  .  . .  ,  '  .  .  . .-· 
financial  guarantees,  notably in the case of developing countries 
op;osed to the conclusion of  gener~ agreements  ;  . ,.  ~:  ;. 
·-'  . 
- the Community's  specific interest fn negotiating investment  clmses. With 
•  - •  •  \';...t  .  •  •.  -- ·,  .  ·  ..  ;.  .  •  •  .  •  .  .  ·.,  .  >  •  • 
groups  of developing countries.  .A  regio~al approach of this kind would 
. .  .  .  .  '~  '  .  ·.  . 
permit  a  better balance  o'f  oooperatio~ and would  hel~ _to  harmonize  ·,  : 
investment  conditions by establishing at  one and ,the same time .a.  :c:·': 
.  .  '  I  ,  .  ,, 
·large number  of. contractual relations·  bet.~een.  the Community  and the · 
d_eveloping countries in question. 